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Should Easier Access to International Credit Replace Foreign Aid?
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We examine the interaction between foreign aid and binding borrowing constraint for a 
recipient country. We also analyze how these two instruments affect economic growth via 
non-linear relationships. First of all, we develop a two-country, two-period trade-theoretic 
model to develop testable hypotheses and then we use dynamic panel analysis to test those 
hypotheses empirically. Our main findings are that: (i) better access to international credit for 
a recipient country reduces the amount of foreign aid it receives, and (ii) there is a critical 
level of international financial transfer, and the marginal effect of foreign aid is larger than that 
of loans if and only if the transfer (loans or foreign aid) is below this critical level. 
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Much has been written about the eectiveness or otherwise of foreign aid. Empirical studies
on the subject can broadly be classied into three types: foreign aid works (see for example
Dalgaard et al., 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2000); foreign aid does not work (see, for example,
Easterly, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005); and foreign aid works under some conditions
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002).1
Convinced that foreign aid does not work, Bauer (1971) argued that it should be replaced
by free or easier access to the international credit market. He argued that foreign aid is
misused and the need to repay loans would make the recipients use them more eectively.2
Foreign aid and international credit can help foster the economic growth of a developing
country through various channels: (i) they add to the investible resources for domestic
investment, and, thus, augment capital stock; and (ii) they can bridge the foreign exchange
gap of a developing country, which, in turn, may provide it with a necessary cushion to import
capital goods.3 Capital inows may also generate two eects that can be detrimental to the
recipient's economy: (i) aid, in particular, which is mainly transferred to the governments,
may induce politicians to engage in its misappropriation; and (ii) capital inows, particularly
a large inow of it, can result in overvaluation of exchange rate of a recipient country, which
may render its exports less competitive in the world market. Since most of foreign aid
constitutes direct transfers to governments, its impact on economic growth depends on how
it is utilized. If aid is used to nance complementary goods in developing countries, such
as infrastructure and human development, its eect will be positive. But if it crowds out
private investment or is used to generate rent seeking activities by politicians, its eect will
1For a detailed review of the literature on foreign aid, see Lahiri, 2006; McGillivray et al., 2006.
2Stern (1974) while reviewing Bauer (1971) made a robust defense of foreign aid as an instrument for
development.
3These arguments are based on the so-called two-gap model of economic development. See, Chenery and
Strout (1966).
1be negative. As indicated by Harms and Lutz (2006), the net eect of aid on economic
growth, therefore, will depend on which eect dominates.
Even when foreign aid is eective, it is not clear a priori that it is the best form of
assistance from abroad.4 In particular, better access to the international credit market
could, for reasons outlined in Bauer (1971), be more eective than foreign aid. We shall
examine if that is indeed the case, and revisit this issue both theoretically and empirically.
It should also be pointed out that both foreign aid and foreign lending are much lower
than what many development practitioners would like. As far as foreign aid is concerned,
although it was agreed by all parties at the United Nations (after the publication of the
Pearson Commission Report in the 1960s) that developed countries should provide 1% of
their national income as aid, the actual amount of aid has fallen far short of this gure, except
for four or ve countries. As for loans, there is extensive evidence to suggest that private
rms in many developing countries face severe credit constraints. Galindo and Schiantarelli
(2003) provide evidence for several Latin American countries. Harrison and McMillan (2003)
nd that many manufacturing rms in the Ivory Coast face severe credit constraints. Using
rm-level data in the manufacturing sector from six African countries, Bigsten et al. (2003)
estimate the extent of credit constraints among rms of various sizes. H ericourt and Poncet
(2007) nd binding credit constraints among private manufacturing rms in China. Finally,
Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide extensive evidence of sector-level nancial development
(or the lack of it) for 41 developed and developing countries.
For our theoretical contribution, we construct a two-period, two-country (recipient and
donor) trade-theoretic model where the recipient country is subject to a binding borrowing
constraint. The donor gives foreign aid in period 1 for the provision of a public input.
However, foreign aid is fully fungible and the recipient spends only a certain fraction of
foreign aid for the public input and the rest is given back to the consumers as lump-sum
4See Addison et al. (2005) for a discussion on alternative ways of nancing development assistance.
2payments. This fraction is chosen optimally by the recipient government. In this framework,
we compare the eect of a relaxation of the borrowing constraint with an equivalent amount
of foreign aid, on the recipient welfare. We nd that when the initial level of lending and
foreign aid are low, the marginal eect on welfare of a change in foreign aid is larger than
that of a relaxation of the borrowing constraint. When the initial levels of foreign aid and
lending are large, we get the opposite eect.
We also consider a situation when the donor government choses the level of foreign aid
optimally. We assume the donor to be altruistic.5 To be more specic, we consider a
simultaneous-move game where each government chooses respectively the instrument at its
disposal. In this case we nd that a relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces the
amount of foreign aid the donor gives.
From our theoretical analysis, we thus derive two testable hypotheses: (i) more loans
reduces the level of foreign aid, and (ii) foreign aid is more (less) eective than loans if the
initial level of the two variables is low (high). In our empirical analysis, we test these two
hypothesis using a panel data on 114 aid-recipient countries for the period 1997-2008. Data
on foreign aid is collected from the OECD, and to measure access to foreign borrowing, we
take oshore bank loans data from the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) Locational
Banking Statistics. We estimate two separate sets of regressions using the system General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) approach, mainly to address the endogeneity problem in
multiple variables. In the rst, we regress aid against loans and other control variables. Our
results strongly support hypothesis (i) above. In the second, in order to test hypothesis (ii)
we regress growth rate of GDP against aid, the square of aid, loans, the square of loans and
other controls. We nd a U-shaped relationship between growth and loans, and an inverted
U-shaped relationship between growth and aid. These two together imply that the marginal
5It is well known that in reality donors have many motives for giving foreign aid, and self-interest also
play a major role in aid allocation. See, for example, Maizels and Nissanke (1984).
3eect of aid on growth is bigger (smaller) than that of loans at lower (higher) levels of the
two variables, supporting our theoretical ndings.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we shall develop the
theoretical framework. This section is divided into two subsections. In subsection 2.1, we
consider the case where foreign aid is exogenous and examine the eects of foreign aid and
loans on growth. In section 2.2, foreign aid is optimally chosen by the donor and there we
examine the eect of a relaxation of the borrowing constraint on the optimal level of foreign
aid. Section 3 carries out the empirical analysis. It is also divided into two subsection. In
subsection 3.1, we estimate the eect of loans on foreign aid, and in section 3.2 the eects
of aid and loans on growth. Some concluding remarks are made in section 4.
2 The Basic Theoretical Model
There are two countries, and two periods. The countries are a recipient country of foreign
aid (labeled ) and a donor country (labeled ). In period 1, the recipient country receives
T amount of foreign aid from the donor. Foreign aid is given for the purpose of providing
a public input, the level of which is denoted by g. However, we assume that foreign aid
is fully fungible and the recipient can allocate a proportion of it as lump-sum payments to
consumers.6 The recipient government uses a proportion  of foreign aid and an amount  L
obtained by lump-sum taxation of its nationals, to pay for a public input g which increases
production in period 2. Given the diculties in most countries with lump-sum taxation, we
shall take  L to be exogenous.7 In each period and in each country, there are n private goods
produced and consumed. The consumption side of the two economies is represented by the
inter-temporal expenditure function of a representative consumer: E(p;p=(1 + r);u) and
E(p;p=(1+r);u u) respectively, where u and u are utility levels, and r and r interest
6Many studies have found that, for all intents and purposes, aid is indeed fungible, See, for example,
Boone, 1996; Feyzioglu et al., 1998; and Swaroop et al., 2000.
7See Wilson (1991) on limitations on lump-sum taxation.
4rates, in the two countries, and the nx1 vector p is the vector of prices.8 In specifying the
expenditure function in the donor country, we have assumed that its representative consumer
is altruistic toward its counterpart in the recipient country and  is the altruism parameter.
We shall assume both countries to be small in goods market so that p is exogenously given.
The revenue functions | which represent the total value added | in the two countries in
period 1 are given by R1(p;  K) and R1(p) where  K is the level of initial capital stock in
the recipient country.9 In period 2, the revenue functions are R2(p;  K + I;g) and R2(p)
where I is the level of investment made in period 1, R2
33  0, and R2
22 < 0. We also assume
that private capital and public input are complements (R2
23  0).
The inter-temporal budget constraint for the representative consumers are:
E
(p;p=(1 + r);u
) + I = R
1(p;  K) +
R2(p;  K + I;g)
1 + r








1 + r   T; (2)
where (1   )T is the part of foreign aid that is returned to the representative consumer in
recipient country as a lump-sum transfer. Following Lahiri and Raimondos-Mller (1997),
we assume that there is a diminishing return to the part of foreign aid that is returned to the
consumers in a lump-sum fashion, and this is represented by the function f() with f0 > 0
and f00 < 0. This assumption is also consistent with ndings in the recent literature that
show that, due to a whole host of reasons, the marginal eect of a large ow of foreign aid
can be negligible or negative (see Mavrotas (2006) for a discussion of the issues).
The budget constraint for the government in the recipient country is:
g =  L + T; (3)
8The partial derivative of an expenditure function with respect to the price of a good is the compensated
demand function of that good. For this and other properties of the the expenditure function see, for example,
Dixit and Norman (1980).
9Endowment other than capital are omitted as they do not vary in our analysis. The partial derivative
of a revenue function with respect to the price of a good is the output supply function of that good.
5i.e., public input is nanced by a xed lump-sum taxation and a proportion of foreign aid.
The level of investment in the recipient country is determined optimally by the represen-
tative consumer. It is done by setting @u=@I = 0, taking r as given. This gives:
1 = R
2
2 =(1 + r): (4)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of investment in the sense of consumption foregone,
and the right-hand side is the present value of the marginal return to investment.
We assume that the representative consumer in the donor country can borrow as much as
he/she wants from the international capital market at an exogenous interest rate r. How-
ever, the representative consumer in the recipient country is subject to a binding borrowing
constraint. He/she can borrow only the amount  B in period 1 and repay this amount with





1 + I  

R
1    L + f((1   )T)






where B() is the demand for loans in period 1 in the recipient country.10
This completes the description of the basic model. It has ve equations in (1)-(5) and
ve endogenous variables u, u, g, I and r.
2.1 The case of exogenous aid
In this section we shall rst consider the optimal determination of the proportion  allocated
for the provision of public input g. Having done so, we shall then compare the eect of a
change in the level of foreign aid with that of a relaxation of the borrowing constraint.
10E
i is the partial derivative with respect to the ith argument of the expenditure function. For example,
E1 is the nx1 vector of period-1 consumptions. All vectors are column vectors and for a vector x, its transpose
is denoted by x0.




























) =  dT; (7)
where Ei
3 is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income in country i (i = ; ). It is
also well-known that Ei
33 > 0 (i = ; ) implying diminishing marginal utility of income.
The rst term on the right-hand side of (6) is the intertemporal term-of-trade eect: an
increase in the rate of interest lowers the welfare of the borrower. For a given level of the
interest rate, an increase in foreign aid raises the welfare of the recipient in two ways: (i) it
increases the provision of the public input and thus welfare and this eect is proportional to
 (the proportion of aid allocated for public input provision), and (ii) it increases the lump-
sum income of the recipient and this is proportion to the proportion of aid not allocated
for public input provision. An increase in  has a positive eect on recipient welfare (via
increase in the provision of public input) and a negative eect (a decrease in the lump-sum
income out of foreign aid). An increase in foreign aid reduces the income of the donor and,
thus, its welfare, for a given level of recipient welfare (see (7)).





23dg + dr: (8)
That is, an increase in public input g increases the level of investment because of the comple-
mentarity between the public input and private capital, and an increase in the rate of interest
r reduces investment by reducing the present value of the rate of return on investment.




































































A relaxation of the borrowing constraint  B increases the supply of loans and thus reduces
the rate of interest. An increase in T increases utility of the recipient and thus the level
of private consumption in period 1. This increases the demand for loans and thus the
equilibrium interest rate. This eect is given by the rst term in the coecient of dT in (9).
An increase in T increases the provision of public input making investments more protable.
This increases the demand for investment expenditure and, thus, the demand for loans,
increasing the equilibrium interest rate. This is the second term. An increase in T increases
the lump-sum income of the recipient in period 1, reducing the demand for loans and, thus,
the equilibrium interest rate. This eect is given by the third term in the coecient of dT.
An increase in , like an increase in T, has three eects on the rate of interest. The only
dierence is that an increase in  reduces the lump-sum income of the recipient in period 1
and this increases the demand for loans and the equilibrium interest rate.


















































A relaxation of the borrowing constraint (i.e., an increase in  B) increases welfare by reducing
the interest rate. The eects of T and  on u now have, in addition to the ones discussed
after (6), the eects via induced changes in the interest rate.
8After setting @u=@ = 0 and some simplications, we get the rst order condition for
the recipient government's optimization problem:
u
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 K + I
1 + r
> 0:
There are two groups of eects from a rise in  on the welfare of the recipient. The rst
is via an increase in the public input provision and these eects are given by the rst term
in (11). The second group of eects comes via a reduction in the lump-sump income out of
foreign aid (induced by an increase in ), and these eects are given by the second term in
(11).















We are now in a position to compare the eect of foreign aid with that of a relaxation
of the borrowing constraint. We assume that at low level of borrowing, price elasticity of
demand for loans () is very high. This would be the case, for example, when there is some
indivisibility in the use of loans. We have already assumed that f0 (marginal eect of aid) is
large and positive at low levels of foreign aid. From these two assumptions and (12) it follows
that at lower levels of borrowing and foreign aid, a relaxation of the borrowing constraint
will have a smaller eect on recipient welfare than an equivalent increase in foreign aid, but
at higher levels of borrowing and foreign aid, the eects will be just the opposite. This result
is stated formally in the following proposition.
9Proposition 1 At low (high) levels of borrowing and foreign aid, an increase in foreign
aid has a bigger (smaller) eect on recipient welfare than an equivalent relaxation in the
borrowing constraint.
The above proposition will be tested in section 3.2.
2.2 Borrowing Constraints and Aid
In this section we shall examine how the optimal values of aid T change when the borrowing
constraint facing the recipient is relaxed a little. For doing so, we shall consider the optimal
determination of the amount of aid T and the proportion  allocated for the provision of
public input g. In particular, we shall consider a simultaneous game between two govern-
ments: the donor decides the level of T and the recipient . The rst-order condition for the
recipient government is the same as (11). To obtain the rst-order condition for the donor

































































Most of the eects in (13) appear via changes in the utility of the recipient and those
have been explained before. The only extra eect is the direct negative eect of T on donor
welfare (see (7)). This extra eect is the rst term in the coecient of dT above.































10Equations (11) and (14) simultaneously determine the equilibrium levels of T and  in
terms of  B and other exogenous variables. We now want to examine the sign of dT=d  B. For












T  B; (15)






T > 0 for the stability of the Nash equilibrium.
From the second-order condition for the recipient country's optimization problem, we
have u
 < 0. It can be easily veried that u
  B > 0 and that u

T  B < 0 if the marginal utility
of income in the recipient country is suciently large (i.e., E
3 suciently small), and this
is a reasonable assumption for a suciently poor country. From (15), it then follows that
when u

T < 0, we have dT=d  B < 0, i.e., borrowing and foreign aid are substitutes. The
sucient condition u

T < 0 is equivalent to saying that for the donor the two instruments
are strategic substitutes. Formally,
Proposition 2 A relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces the amount of foreign aid
if the donor's reaction function is downward sloping and if the marginal utility of income for
the recipient is suciently large.
A relaxation of the borrowing constraint benets the recipient country for a given level
of foreign aid. This eect on the welfare of the recipient also aect the welfare of the donor
as it is altruistic. However, the marginal benet of giving aid is weighted by the ratios of
the marginal utility of income levels of the two countries in the welfare calculations. If the
marginal utility of income of the recipient is higher than that of the donor, a relaxation of the
borrowing constraint reduces the marginal benet of giving aid without altering the marginal
cost (which is unity), and thus reduces the optimal level of foreign aid. This is the direct
eect. There is an indirect eect via an induced change in the value of . A relaxation of
the borrowing constraint reduces the interest rate and thus increases the present value of the
11marginal benet of increasing  (via an increase in the level of the public input provision).
This increases the equilibrium level of . This increase in  will reduce the equilibrium level
of foreign aid if aid and  are strategic substitutes for the donor.
The proposition will also be tested in section 3.1
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Borrowing and foreign aid
3.1.1 Description of data
We begin the empirical analysis by testing the second proposition of our theoretical model
that a relaxation of borrowing constraints reduces the amount foreign aid received. Our
data set comprises 114 aid-recipient countries over the period 1997-2008.11 This study oers
a separate analysis on the allocation of total and bilateral foreign assistance, whose data
are taken from the online database of Development Aid Committee (DAC-2011) of the
OECD.12 The aid data contain net disbursements for development objectives and, thus,
exclude military aid. We convert these data into constant USD2005 using the consumer price
index for low and middle income countries. The gures for foreign aid are typically corrected
for the size of the recipient countries. In the literature, there are two alternative ways for
doing so: (i) divide foreign aid received by population of the recipient, i.e., compute aid
per capita (see, for example, Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Younas
and Bandyopadhyay, 2009; Younas, 2008), or (ii) compute foreign aid as a percentage of the
GDP of the recipient country (see, for example, Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000;
Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas, 2009). In this paper, we shall use
11The reason for starting our analysis from this time period is due to the availability of cross-border lending
data by the reporting banks from the Bank of International Settlements.
12Total aid is the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid. Since multilateral assistance mostly contains soft
loans, we limit our focus on the other two types of aid.
12both of these alternatives.
To measure access to foreign borrowing, we take oshore bank loans data from the Bank
of International Settlement (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics.13 These data contain cross-
border loans to all sectors in developing countries from banks located in the BIS reporting
countries. Since these are cross-border loans, local lending by banks in a BIS member
country is not included. For example, loans vis- a-vis India are those from BIS reporting
banks located outside of India. India is a BIS reporting country but local lending in for-
eign currencies by banks located in India are not included in the cross-border borrowing.
The cross-border lending data are based on the residence of the reporting institutions and,
therefore, measure the activities of all banking oces residing in each reporting country.
Such oces report exclusively on their own unconsolidated business, which, thus, includes
international transactions with any of their own aliates.14
BIS adjusts the quarterly loans data for exchange rate changes. It also converts the
relevant ow of new loans (net of repayments) in each quarter of the year into its original
currency using end-of-period exchange rates, and subsequently converts the changes in stocks
into dollar amounts using period-average exchange rates. We convert quarterly observations
into annual observations by summing data for the four quarters. As in the case of foreign
aid, the gures for loans are also corrected for the size of the loans recipient country in
two dierent ways: (i) in per capita term, and (ii) as percentage of the GDP of the loans
recipient country. Appendix A gives the list of countries for which we have computed the
loans gures.
13In the literature there are a few alternative data sources for credits. The country-level measures of credit
constraints come from the Financial Structure Database, compiled by Beck et al., (2000) and updated by
Beck and Demirg u c-Kunt (2009). The sector level variables such as external nance dependence and asset
tangibility come from Rajan and Zingales (1998), and these have been updated in Chor and Manova (2011).
The third is the BIS data (see, for example, Papaioannou (2009) and Hermann and Mihaljek (2011)). The
rst two sources give us information on the extent of credit constraints and the third source gives us data
on the ow of foreign loans. Since the purpose of this paper is to compare the ow of net foreign aid with
that of net foreign loans received by a country, we use the third source.
14Detailed information on the locational banking statistics is available on the BIS website under
http://www.bis.org/statistics/.
13While drawing control variables, we take guidelines from the empirical literature on aid.
GDP per capita (in constant USD2000) captures the altruistic motivation for aid allocation.
An obvious drawback of using GDP per capita as a proxy for economic need results from
its skewed distribution due to high income inequalities in developing countries. Thus, as
an alternative measure of economic needs, we also employ infant mortality rates in some
of our models' specications.15 Population is included to examine the size related biases
in aid allocation as past studies consistently nd that countries with smaller population
receive more aid.16 Trade openness (percentage of exports plus imports to GDP) captures
the inuence of trade and macroeconomic policies of a developing country on aid allocation.
This also resonates well with the commercial motives of donor nations in giving more aid to
economically open regimes (e.g., Younas, 2008). While ination measures macroeconomic
instability, its squared term is included to examine its diminishing eect on aid. Data for all
these control variables are taken from the online resource of World Development Indicators
(2010) of the World Bank.
An overwhelming empirical literature on aid nds that democratic countries receive more
aid (e.g., Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Trumbull and Wall, 1994). Thus, we employ data on
\political rights and civil liberties" from Freedom House (2010). \Political rights" refers
to freedom of the people to participate in the political process through voting, organizing
their own political party, and forming eective opposition, while \civil liberties" entail the
freedoms of expression, religious belief, movement, and right to form unions. Each of these
two indices is measured on a scale from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Following Trumbull and
Wall (1994) and Younas and Bandyopadhyay (2009) among others, we rst add and then
revert these two indices so that the resulting index ranges from 2 (worst) to 14 (best). As a
15The World Bank (2010) denes infant mortality rate as the number of infants dying before reaching
one year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year. Some data observations for infant mortality rate are
missing for some countries. Since these values change slowly over time, we interpolated missing observations
by calculating averages from available values (Younas and Bandyopadhyay, 2009; Younas, 2008).
16See seminal study of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) for a detailed discussion about the small country
eect and foreign aid allocation.
14robustness check, we also employ data on \voice and accountability" compiled by Kaufmann
et al. (2009). This index scores between -2.5 and 2.5, where a higher value indicates that
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, and enjoy freedom of expression,
freedom of association and free media.
In addition, all of our econometric specications include time-invariant country-specic
xed eects to account for the usual politico-strategic considerations for aid allocation.17
We also include time dummy variables in all specications to account for unexpected events
such as ood, drought or other calamities, which may lead to aid spikes for any given year.
3.1.2 The empirical methodology
The following econometric concerns guide our choice of empirical methodology; ignoring
these may cause the estimates to be biased and inconsistent: (i) the joint eect of multiple
endogenous variables in aid regressions such as foreign loans, GDP per capita, trade open-
ness, among others. (ii) unobserved country-specic factors that may correlate with other
explanatory variables; and, (iii) persistence in aid allocation over time. In their inuential
paper on aid, Hansen and Tarp (2001) recommend using a dynamic panel generalized method
of moment (GMM) estimator for deriving estimation results. This method is particularly
useful when endogeneity is suspected in multiple variables, as in our application.18
In an empirical cross-country analysis, one can employ two kinds of GMM panel esti-
mators: the dierence-GMM estimators as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the
system-GMM estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). As for endogeneity, Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) point out that the lagged levels as used in the dierence-GMM are
often poor instruments for the rst dierences. The system-GMM uses additional moment
17See Dreher et al. (2009) and Kuziemko and Werker (2006) for a detailed discussion on these considera-
tions for aid allocation.
18Lack of nding appropriate instruments for many endogenous variables and non-availability of their data
for developing countries renders the alternative method of two-stage least square (2SLS) infeasible, and the
use of invalid instruments could contaminate the estimation results rather than improve them.
15conditions and combines the regressions, one in rst dierences and one in levels, using both
lagged dierences and lagged levels as instruments. This estimator reduces potential biases
and is considered to increase eciency (e.g., Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Bandyopadhyay et al.,
2011).
The system-GMM is also particularly well suited for large cross sections and a small
number of time periods, which is the case in our sample. One potential concern, however, is
that this estimator may increase the bias in the estimates if it utilizes more instruments. In
each regression we tested, the numbers of instruments utilized are less than numbers of cross
sections.19 We employ the two-step GMM estimator in all regressions, which is considered
asymptotically ecient and robust to all kinds of heteroskedasticity (Asiedu and Lien, 2011;
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011). We also test for the validity of instruments and the presence
of autocorrelation in each regression. For all the regressions, our results conrm the validity
of instruments and the absence of autocorrelation.20
We estimate the following equation for aid:
ln(aid)it = 0 + 1 ln(loans)it + 2 ln(aid)i;t 1 + X
0
it + i + t + it; (16)
where subscripts i refers to countries, t to time, i to the country-specic eects, t to the
time-eect, X to the vector of control variables discussed above, and it to the error term.
For reasons mentioned before, we shall use two dierent measures of aid and loans: in per
capita terms and as percentage of GDP. By its construction, the dynamic GMM estimator
takes rst dierence of Equation (16), which eliminates the country-specic xed-eects.
We prefer estimating a log-log model for the following reasons: (i) Most variables in our
study vary across wide range (such as aid per capita, loans per capita, GDP per capita,
population size and trade openness, among others), and also exhibit skewed distribution.
19Roodman (2007) states that in a study involving panel GMM estimator the number of instruments
should ideally be less than the number of cross-sections, which is the case in all of our regressions.
20See the numbers of instruments utilized, Hansen J test, and second-order autocorrelation test reported
in Tables 2-4.
16Therefore, log transformation smooths the data; (ii) This reduces the eect of outliers on es-
timates; and (iii) The estimated coecients can be interpreted as elasticities. The descriptive
statistics are reported in Table 1.21
3.1.3 Estimation results
Tables 2-4 present results for aid equation. In Table 2, Column (1) reports the results of our
baseline model, where we include log loans per capita, log GDP per capita and the lagged
value of log total aid per capita. Consistent with the prediction of our theoretical model,
the coecient of log loans per capita is negative and statistically dierent from zero at the
1% level. As expected, the coecient of log GDP per capita is also negative, but it is not
statistically signicant. The eect of lagged log aid per capita is positive and signicant,
implying persistence in aid allocation over time.
Column (2) reports results for the fully specied model by including other control vari-
ables. The coecient of log loans per capita remains negative and signicant at the 1% level,
suggesting that a higher inow of foreign loans is associated with a lower aid allocation. That
is, developing countries having better access to foreign credits receive less foreign aid.
The negative coecient of log GDP per capita also becomes statistically signicant at the
1% level, which is consistent with the previous nding that poor countries receive more aid.
A negative and signicant coecient of log population conrms the bias in aid allocation
to the small countries. Both trade openness and ination positively impact aid, while the
negative coecient of the squared term of log ination underscores its diminishing eect. As
expected, better conditions of political rights and civil liberties positively inuence aid, but
their eects are not statistically signicant.
21Data on some observations for some variables also exhibit negative values. Following others in the
literature, we linearly transform all variables by adding a constant in their values so that their lowest value
equals zero.
17As a robustness check, in column (3), we drop the political rights and civil liberties vari-
able and instead include an alternative measure of democracy \log voice and accountability",
which has positive and signicant impact on aid at the 1% level. Likewise, in columns (4)
and (5), we replace log GDP per capita with log infant mortality rate. The positive and
signicant impact of infant mortality rate conrms that, all else equal, poverty remains a
key criterion for aid allocation. The signicance of political rights and civil liberties in col-
umn (4) and voice and accountability in column (5) further conrms that more democratic
regimes are rewarded with aid. In each regression in Table 2, both the Hansen J and 2nd
order autocorrelation tests conrm the validity of the instruments and the absence of serial
correlation, respectively.
The inclusion of the new control variables in our fully specied models in columns (2-5)
leaves the coecient of the loans per capita negative, robust at around 0.037 and statistically
signicant at the 1% level. This suggests that a one percent increase in loans per capita is
associated with a 0.037 percent decline in aid per capita. In monetary terms, this amounts
to a reduction of total aid per capita of 2.091 USD for the average, and 1.270 USD for
the median country in our sample. Note that in both columns (3) and (4), the estimated
coecient of lagged log aid per capita is 0.289, while the estimated coecient of log loans
per capita is 0.037. Thus, the long run eect on aid per capita is 0.052 (= 0.037/(1 - 0.289)),
which implies that the aid reduction eect of loans increases over time.
Let us consider an example to get a better sense of this aid reduction eect of loans.
Take two countries in our study Mexico, who received the lowest (1.12 USD), and Cape
Verde, who received the highest (328.43 USD) amount of average aid per capita over the
sample period. Then a one percent increase in loans per capita will induce a reduction of
aid per capita of 0.042 USD in the short run and 0.056 in the long run for Mexico; and
this amounts stands at 12.152 USD in the short run and 16.422 in the long run for Cape
Verde. In total dollar value, this reduces aid by 4.217 million USD in the short run and
185.622 million USD in the long run for Mexico, while for Cape Verde this reduction in aid
amounts to 5.564 million USD in the short run and 7.519 million USD in the long run. To
oer yet another perspective, this reduces total aid by 76.830 million USD in the short run
and 103.824 million USD in the long run for China, which is the most populous country in
our sample. For Dominica, which is the least populous country in our sample, this reduction
stands at 0.806 million USD in the short run and 1.089 million USD in the long run.
Next we examine whether the inuence of loans on aid changes when we replace our
dependent variable log total aid per capita with log bilateral aid per capita in Equation (16).
The results in Table 3 show that log loans per capita has both quantitatively and qualitatively
approximately the same eect on log bilateral aid per capita as for log total aid per capita in
Table 2. This is true both for our baseline model as well as for our fully specied models. In
fact, the magnitude of the coecient of log loans per capita shows a marginal decrease from
0.037 to 0.043 in our fully specied model in column (3). In monetary terms, this amounts
to a reduction of bilateral aid per capita of 1.525 USD for the average, and 1.476 USD for
the median country in our sample. This long run eect is 0.056 (= 0.043/(1 - 0.229)), which,
further strengthens our ndings that the aid reduction eect of loans increases over time.
The sign, signicance, and interpretation of all other control variables remain the same as
above.22
Finally, we run regressions by redening our dependent variables as log total aid/GDP,
log bilateral aid/GDP, and our key independent variable as log loans/GDP. We use log
transformations of these variables for the same reasons as mentioned above. Table 4 reports
the estimation results of the fully specied models for both log total aid/GDP and for
log bilateral aid/GDP. In 5 out of 6 regressions, the coecients of log loans/GDP remain
negative and signicant at the 1% level. These results further strengthen our ndings in
Tables 2 and 3 and, hence, our theoretical prediction that better access to foreign credits
22The variable of political rights and civil liberties which was statistically insignicant in column (2) of
Table 1 remains statistically signicant for all regressions of log bilateral aid per capita.
19reduces ow of aid to the developing countries. In fact, these ndings suggest that the aid
reduction inuence of loans is substantially larger. For example, the size of the coecient of
log loans/GDP is 0.042 in log total aid/GDP regression in column (2), and its size is 0.071
for log bilateral aid/GDP regression in column (5). This suggests that the long run aid
reduction eect of loans is 0.138 (= 0.042/(1 - 0.696)) for total aid/GDP, while it is 0.169
(= 0.071/(1 - 0.581)) for bilateral aid/GDP. The ndings of all other control variables are
as expected.
3.2 Borrowing, foreign aid and growth
3.2.1 Description of data and the empirical model
In this section, we test the rst proposition of our theoretical model that at low (high)
levels of borrowing and foreign aid, an increase in foreign aid has a bigger (smaller) eect on
recipient welfare than an equivalent relaxation in the borrowing constraint. Following the
empirical literature on aid-growth, we use growth rate of real GDP per capita to measure
welfare (e.g., Arndt et al., 2010; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001). The
main variables of interests for testing this proposition are foreign aid and foreign loans.
Our empirical methodology still rests on the application of dynamic panel model based
on the system-GMM estimator as employed for aid regressions in Table 2-4. This method has
also been favored by several other recent contributions in aid-growth literature (e.g., Arndt
et al., 2010; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007; Hansen and Tarp, 2001). Our empirical strategy
of using log-log model and, thus, necessary transformations of variables exhibiting negative
values remains the same as discussed above in section 3.1.
Our empirical growth model takes the following form:
ln(growth)it = 0 + 1ln(aid)it + 2(ln(aid))
2
it + 3ln(loans)it + 4(ln(loans))
2
it
+ 5ln(growth)i;t 1 + Z
0
it + i + t + it; (17)
20where subscripts i refers to countries, t to time, i to the country-specic eects, t to the
time-eect, Z to the vector of control variables, and it to the disturbance term. Once again
we use two alternative measures for aid and loans: in per capita terms and as percentage of
GDP. Our main variables of interests in equation (17) are: log aid, log loans, (log aid)2 and
(log loans)2. Based on the rst proposition of our theoretical model, we hypothesize that
1 > 0; 2 < 0; 3 < 0, and 4 > 0. That is, if these four coecients turn out to be as
hypothesized, then the marginal eect of aid is higher (lower) than that of loans when the
magnitude of these two variables is small (large).
With regards to the selection of control variable, we take guidelines from the recent aid-
growth literature (e.g., Arndt et al., 2010; Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007; Burnside and Dollar,
2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001). Specically, we include: log xed capital formation as proxied
by investment/GDP, log initial real GDP per capita, log ination and its squared term, log
government consumption/GDP, log secondary school enrollments, log rule of law and the
lagged value of log growth rate of real GDP per capita. Rule of law reects the strength and
impartiality of the legal system, as well as the enforcement of property rights. For robustness
analysis, we also replace log initial real GDP per capita with log infant mortality rates.
Many inuential past studies conclude that countries' institutions are important for their
economic growth and poverty alleviation (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004).
Thus, we also employ alternative measures of institutional quality to examine whether the
results of our main variables of interest remain robust with their inclusion. Data for the
rule of law and other institutional measures such as regulatory quality and government
eectiveness are taken from Kaufmann et al. (2009). A higher score of these institutional
indices indicates better quality.23 Data for all the other control variables come from WDI
(2010). The descriptive statistics of all these variables are presented in Table 1.
23While regulatory quality captures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations promoting private sector development, government eectiveness mainly measures
the quality of public services and the degree of its independence from political pressures.
213.2.2 Estimation results
Tables 5-8 report the results. In table 5, column (1) presents the estimation results of
the model that includes log total aid per capita and log loans per capita but not their
squared terms; it, however, includes all other standard control variables. We nd that
while the coecient of log loans per capita is positive and signicant at the 1% level, the
eect of log aid per capita is not statistically signicant. This nding of aid is consistent
with Boone (1996), who concludes that aid has no signicant impact on macroeconomic
variables. Boone's empirical results, however, have been questioned by subsequent studies,
which, unlike Boone, model aid-growth relation in the non-linear form (e.g., Burnside and
Dollar, 2000; Durbarry et al., 1998; Hadjimichael et al., 1995; Hansen and Tarp, 2001).
Column (2) presents estimation results of our fully specied model which also includes
squared terms of both log total aid per capita and log loans per capita. The positively signif-
icant coecient of log total aid per capita and negatively signicant coecient of its squared
term conrm diminishing marginal returns to aid. This suggests that while some countries
may utilize aid eectively, others lack the absorptive capacity or institutional quality with
which to complement aid. This also indicates that after reaching a threshold level, the nega-
tive rent seeking eect of aid dominates its positive infrastructure building eect, as pointed
out in Harms and Lutz (2006).24 On the other hand, the negative signicant coecient of log
loans per capita and positive signicant coecient of its squared term suggests an increasing
marginal return to loans. The signs of the coecients of these main variables of our interests
agree with our prior.
We evaluate the marginal eect of aid on growth (1 +22 Aid) at the mean value of aid
per capita, 5.23.25 We also evaluate this eect at its median value, 5.17, to deal with the
24See Hansen and Tarp (2001) for a detailed discussion on the theoretical arguments about non-linear eect
of aid on economic growth, which relate to absorptive capacity constraints, Dutch disease and institutional
destruction problems in developing countries.
25For every regressions, the marginal eect of aid at its mean value (along with the signicance of the
marginal eect) is also reported in Table 5.
22problem of skewed distribution of aid across countries and time. These calculations show
that a one percent increase in the aid per capita induces an increase of roughly 0.05 percent
in growth when this eect is evaluated at its mean value, and it spurs about 0.06 percent of
growth when evaluated at its median level. Interestingly, this marginal impact of aid does
not turn negative even when it is evaluated at a very high value of aid in our sample. For
example, this eect is 0.04% when evaluated at 90th percentile of aid. This suggests that
although aid is most eective at low level and its marginal eect decreases quite fast, it never
has a growth demoting eect in our sample countries and time periods. This nding appears
to appeal to the morals of giving aid as underscored by Stern (1974), who argues for the
transfer from the better-o to the worse-o countries if the benet to the latter justies the
cost to the former.
Next we evaluate the marginal eect of loans on growth (3 + 24 Loans). Notice that
both mean, 9.28, and median, 9.27, values of loans per capita are approximately the same;
therefore, we report its marginal eect evaluated at its mean value.26 This marginal eect
of loans per capita on growth is 0.32, which is 84.38 percent higher than the marginal eect
of aid per capita at its mean. This implies that starting at the mean level, an increase in
aid will result in a decline in its positive eect on growth, while an increase in loans will
augment its positive eect on growth. This, however, also implies that starting at a low
level, aid has a larger positive eect on growth than loans. In fact, the negative eect of
loans does not turn positive until it attains a fairly large value. These ndings agree with
the rst proposition of our theoretical model.
The marginal eects of aid and loans computed above have been at their respective mean
and median values. However, it is of interest to compute the critical level of nancial transfer
(either aid or loans) below (above) which the marginal eect of aid (loans) is larger. To do
so we need to compute the value of X such that 1 +22 X = 3 +24 X. For column 2
26Like aid, the marginal eect of loans (along with the signicance of the marginal eect) is also reported
in Table 5.
23of table 5, the value of X is computed as 6:479 which is higher than the mean value of total
aid per capita and lower than the mean value of loans per capita.27
Many past studies state that a change in control variables can change the results in growth
regression (see, for example, Dollar and Levin, 2004). Thus, we check whether the results of
our variables of interest are robust to the introduction of alternative controls that explain
growth. In column (3), we replace log initial GDP per capita with log infant mortality rates.
Next, we replace log rule of law with log regulatory quality and log government eectiveness,
one at a time (see columns 4 and 5). These results show that sign, signicance and even
the magnitude of the coecients of the variables of our interest remain the same with the
inclusion of other control variables.
We now briey discuss the results of control variables. Our results strongly support the
ndings of Hansen and Tarp (2001) that the lagged growth rate has a robust and positive
eect on its current rate as its estimated coecients are signicant at the 1% level in all the
regressions. Although domestic investment as proxied by xed capita formation positively
aect growth, but its statistical signicance is not robust across all the specications. As
expected, initial GDP per capita, infant mortality rates and government consumption nega-
tively inuence growth, while school enrollment positively aects growth. Our ndings also
support the assertion of Rodrik et al. (2004) that institutions are important for growth as
the coecients of rule of law, regulatory quality and government eectiveness are positive
and signicant at the 1% level. Lastly, the sign and signicance of the coecients of ination
and its squared term reect its diminishing eect.
Next we replace log total aid per capita with log bilateral aid per capita as the former also
includes part of multilateral assistance. The results in Table 6 show that the nonlinear eect
of bilateral aid per capita is both quantitatively and qualitatively the same as that of total
27We also compute these values for all our regressions in which the squared values of Aid and Loans
appear, and these are reported in Tables 5-8.
24aid per capita, which further conrms decreasing marginal returns to aid. Like aid per capita,
this positive eect on growth decreases, but it never becomes negative even at the maximum
value of bilateral aid per capita in our sample. For example, in the regression results in
column (2), the partial eect of log bilateral aid per capita evaluated at its maximum value
in our sample (6.37) stands at 0.02.
The negative signicant coecient of log loans per capita and positive signicant coef-
cient of its squared term in all the regressions further conrm increasing returns to loans.
Table 6 also shows that, for all the regressions, the partial eect of loans per capita evaluated
at its mean value is between 40 and 58 percent larger than the partial eects calculated in
Table 5. These results further strengthen our key assertion that the eectiveness of aid in
fostering economic growth is higher at lower levels, while the eectiveness of loans is higher
at higher levels. Similar examples given for the results in Table 5 above to elucidate the rst
proposition of our theoretical model can be replicated in the case for results in Table 6. The
estimated results of all other control variables are as expected and agree with our prior.
Finally, we take our main variables of interest as percentage of GDP: log total aid/GDP,
log bilateral aid/GDP, log oshore bank loans/GDP and their respective squared terms.
These results are presented in Table 7 and 8. In all the regressions, the sign and signicance
of the coecients of aid and loans variables strongly conrm their non-monotonic relationship
with growth, as found in the case of these variables in per capita form.
4 Conclusion
Should foreign aid be replaced by an easier access to international credit? Many in the past
have argued an armative answer to this question. The argument lies partly on the belief
that foreign aid is ineective and partly on the argument that loans give more incentives to
the recipients to utilize them wisely. Whether aid is ineective is a moot point in the rst
25place. Second, whether loans have been eective in the past is also a moot point, as we have
witnessed several nancial crises involving developing countries.
In this paper we revisit these issues in a unied way. First of all we develop a theoretical
model to examine the eect of both foreign aid and loans on the welfare of the recipient
country. We also examine the interaction between foreign aid and loans. Our theoretical
model has two periods and two countries: a recipient and a donor. The recipient country is
subject to a binding borrowing constraint and the donor is altruistic toward the recipient.
Foreign aid is given for the purpose of providing a public input; however, the recipient is
able to optimally divert a proportion of it as lump-sum payments to the consumers. We nd
that both foreign aid and a relaxation of the borrowing constraint increase the welfare of
the recipient. However, the marginal eect of a loan is larger than that of foreign aid if and
only if the initial level of that transfer is suciently large. We also consider the case where
the amount of foreign aid is optimally chosen by the donor, and nd that a relaxation of the
borrowing constraint reduces the equilibrium level of foreign aid.
Having established the above-mentioned propositions, we then test them using data.
We use annual data for the period 1997-2008 for 114 aid-recipient countries. The sources
are the OECD, the World Bank, Freedom House, Kaufmann et al. (2009), and the Bank
of International Settlement. We employ a dynamic panel generalized method of moments
(GMM) analysis to our data set, mainly to address the endogeneity problem in multiple
variables. We use various controls apart from the main variables of interest and use dierent
denitions of the main variables: aid per capita, loans per capita, aid as a proportion of
GDP, and loans as a proportion of GDP. All of our regressions point to a robust non-linear
relationship between growth and aid and between growth and loans. In particular, we nd
strong support for our theoretical prediction that there is a critical value of money transfer,
and if the initial levels of loans or aid are lower than this critical level, then the marginal
eect of foreign aid is larger than that of loans. We also nd strong support of our other
theoretical prediction that more loans do reduce the level of foreign aid.
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32Table 1: Summary statistics for variables used in aid (Equation 16) as well as in growth
regressions (Equation 17).
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ln (Real net total aid per capita) 1347 5.234 0.316 0.000 6.530
Ln (Real net bilateral aid per capita) 1347 5.241 0.247 0.000 6.368
Ln (Net total aid/GDP) 1347 2.092 0.682 0.000 4.597
Ln (Net bilateral aid/GDP) 1347 1.939 0.512 0.000 4.525
Ln (Net oshore bank loans per capita) 1368 9.279 0.260 0.000 10.288
Ln (Net oshore bank loans/GDP) 1362 4.471 0.145 0.000 5.158
Ln (GDP per capita constant 2000USD) 1359 6.940 1.206 4.390 9.739
Ln (Infant mortality) 1368 3.651 0.795 1.065 5.056
Ln (Population) 1368 15.828 1.873 11.172 21.004
Ln (Trade/GDP) 1334 4.312 0.487 2.763 5.647
Ln (Ination) 1358 3.502 0.363 0.000 6.365
Ln (Political rights and civil liberties) 1368 1.975 0.486 0.788 2.639
Ln (Voice and accountability) 1368 0.961 0.302 0.000 1.502
Ln (Growth rate of real GDP per capita) 1362 3.496 0.167 0.000 4.154
Ln (Fixed capital formation/GDP) 1266 3.003 0.394 0.742 4.121
Ln (Initial GDP per capita) 1366 6.827 1.188 4.642 9.342
Ln (Government consumption/GDP) 1279 2.592 0.406 0.975 4.242
Ln (School enrollment) 1037 3.906 0.655 1.609 4.737
Ln (Rule of law) 1360 1.014 0.251 0.000 1.590
Ln (Regulatory quality) 1357 1.161 0.238 0.000 1.656
Ln (Government eectiveness) 1344 1.065 0.251 0.000 1.563
Note: Data for all variables range from 1997-2008. All of the ratios are dened as per-
centage of GDP. Total aid is the sum of bilateral and multilateral aid. Loans data from
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) is adjusted for exchange rate movements (done
by BIS).
33Table 2: Dependent variable: Ln (Total aid per capita); Estimation technique: the system-
GMM
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (Oshore bank loans -0.055*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.037***
per capita) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (GDP per capita) -0.026 -0.040*** -0.050***
(0.128) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Total aid per capita) 0.591*** 0.319*** 0.289*** 0.310*** 0.289***
lagged (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Population) -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.044*** -0.045***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Political rights and 0.007 0.051***
civil liberties) (0.402) (0.000)
Ln (Trade openness) 0.073*** 0.095*** 0.009 0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.342) (0.168)
Ln (Ination) 0.550*** 0.465*** 0.532*** 0.512***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.068*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Voice and 0.107*** 0.152***
accountability) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Infant mortality) 0.023*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000)
Hansen J test1 0.202 0.279 0.258 0.245 0.245
2nd order autocorrelation 0.286 0.388 0.519 0.406 0.536
test2
# of observations 1225 1198 1198 1198 1198
# of countries, n 114 114 114 114 114
# of instruments, i 33 113 113 113 113
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 3.45 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes for this and all subsequent tables: We employ two-step estimation for the system-
GMM, which is considered asymptotically ecient and robust to all kinds of heteroskedasticity.
Superscripts , , and  indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. P values
are in parentheses.
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. (P values)
2 The null hypothesis is that the error term exhibits no second-order serial correlation. (P values)
34Table 3: Dependent variable: Ln (Bilateral aid per capita); Estimation technique: the
system-GMM
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (Oshore bank loans -0.036*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.039***
per capita) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.007 -0.022*** -0.028***
(0.626) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Bilateral aid 0.359*** 0.242*** 0.229*** 0.201*** 0.176***
per capita) lagged (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Population) -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Political rights and 0.040*** 0.015**
civil liberties) (0.000) (0.033)
Ln (Trade openness) 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.004 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.660) (0.566)
Ln (Ination) 0.487*** 0.416*** 0.518*** 0.503***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.058***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Voice and 0.025*** 0.066***
accountability) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Infant mortality) 0.016*** 0.021***
(0.000) (0.000)
Hansen J test 0.064 0.241 0.365 0.266 0.240
2nd order 0.322 0.375 0.385 0.428 0.541
autocorrelation test
# of observations 1225 1198 1198 1198 1198
# of countries, n 114 114 114 114 114
# of instruments, i 33 113 113 113 113
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 3.45 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
35Table 4: Dependent Variable: Aid/GDP; Estimation technique: the system-GMM
Dependent Variables ! Ln (Total aid/GDP) Ln (Bilateral aid/GDP)
Independent Variables # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln (Oshore bank -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.008 -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.036***
loans/GDP (0.008) (0.000) (0.529) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Ln (GDP per capita) -0.167*** -0.174*** -0.166*** -0.168***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Total aid/GDP) 0.683*** 0.696*** 0.785***
lagged (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Bilateral aid/GDP) 0.568*** 0.581*** 0.679***
lagged (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Population) -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Political rights and 0.026* 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.057***
civil liberties) (0.100) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Ln (Trade openness) 0.033*** 0.089*** 0.013 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.024**
(0.004) (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051)
Ln (Ination) 0.236*** 0.058 0.300*** 0.614*** 0.388*** 0.726***
(0.000) (0.144) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.016*** 0.007 -0.020*** -0.064*** -0.036*** -0.072***
(0.005) (0.174) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Ln (Voice and 0.192*** 0.134***
accountability) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Infant mortality) 0.126*** 0.32***
(0.001) (0.000)
Hansen J test 0.214 0.413 0.275 0.329 0.388 0.357
2nd order 0.951 0.882 0.945 0.179 0.17 0.298
autocorrelation test
# of observations 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198
# of countries, n 114 114 114 114 114 114
# of instruments, i 113 113 113 113 113 113
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
36Table 5: Dependent variable: Ln (Growth rate of GDP per capita); Estimation technique:
the system-GMM
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (Total aid per capita) 0.012 0.222*** 0.217*** 0.153*** 0.159***
(0.494) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Ln (Total aid per capita) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.010** -0.013***
squared (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.003)
Ln (Oshore bank loans 0.969*** -0.685*** -0.735*** -0.449*** -0.702***
per capita) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln (Oshore bank loans 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.051***
per capita) squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Growth rate of GDP 0.190*** 0.216*** 0.214*** 0.172*** 0.278***
per capita) lagged (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Fixed capital formation) 0.030* 0.007 0.01 0.027** 0.051***
(0.068) (0.556) (0.221) (0.026) (0.000)
Ln (Initial GDP per capita) -0.014 -0.007 -0.025*** -0.009
(0.124) (0.197) (0.000) (0.136)
Ln (Infant mortality) -0.023***
(0.002)
Ln (Ination) 2.180*** 1.906*** 2.229*** 1.305*** 2.050***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.286*** -0.248*** -0.290*** -0.157*** -0.266***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Govt. consumption) -0.031* -0.033** -0.032** -0.065*** -0.028***
(0.064) (0.014) (0.019) (0.000) (0.011)
Ln (School enrollment) 0.007 0.036*** 0.006 0.052*** 0.039***
(0.777) (0.002) (0.551) (0.000) (0.001)
Ln (Rule of law) 0.058** 0.069*** 0.081***
(0.019) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln (Regulatory quality) 0.151***
(0.000)
Ln (Government eectiveness) 0.077***
(0.002)
Hansen J test 0.411 0.404 0.096 0.599 0.371
2nd order autocorrelation test 0.324 0.666 0.846 0.954 0.398
# of observations 917 917 917 917 917
# of countries, n 110 110 110 110 110
# of instruments, i 68 84 88 84 84
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.62 1.31 1.25 1.31 1.31
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal eect of aid 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.023***
Marginal eect of loans 0.317*** 0.286*** 0.368*** 0.244***
Critical Value of Aid/Loans (X) 6.479 6.704 5.574 6.727
37Table 6: Dependent variable: Ln (Growth rate of GDP per capita); Estimation technique:
the system-GMM
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (Bilateral aid per capita) 0.014 0.233*** 0.252*** 0.185*** 0.175***
(0.648) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Ln (Bilateral aid per capita) -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.014** -0.014***
squared (0.006) (0.001) (0.017) (0.006)
Ln (Oshore bank loans 0.851*** -0.936*** -0.894*** -0.645*** -0.902***
per capita) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln (Oshore bank loans 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.080***
per capita) squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Growth rate of GDP 0.286*** 0.234*** 0.212*** 0.162*** 0.218***
per capita) lagged (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Fixed capital formation) 0.016 0.01 0.015** 0.006 0.039***
(0.348) (0.307) (0.041) (0.543) ( 0.000)
Ln (Initial GDP per capita) -0.022** -0.009 -0.030*** -0.014**
(0.014) (0.129) (0.000) (0.042)
Ln (Infant mortality) -0.030***
(0.000)
Ln (Ination) 1.821*** 1.891*** 2.105*** 1.095*** 1.839***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.236*** -0.247*** -0.274*** -0.131*** -0.239***
-0.001 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Ln (Govt. consumption) -0.029* -0.033** -0.040*** -0.049*** -0.042***
(0.057) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (School enrollment) 0.032 0.034*** -0.020* 0.055*** 0.041***
(0.162) (0.002) (0.064) (0.000) (0.001)
Ln (Rule of law) 0.057*** 0.077*** 0.059***
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000)




Hansen J test 0.428 0.328 0.963 0.612 0.443
2nd order autocorrelation test 0.35 0.603 0.493 0.265 0.551
# of observations 917 917 917 917 917
# of countries, n 110 110 110 110 110
# of instruments, i 68 84 88 84 84
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.62 1.31 1.25 1.31 1.31
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal eect of aid 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.038*** 0.028***
Marginal eect of loans 0.549*** 0.479*** 0.654*** 0.583***
Critical Value of Aid/Loans (X) 6.026 6.229 4.940 5.729
38Table 7: Dependent variable: Ln (Growth rate of GDP per capita); Estimation technique:
the system-GMM
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (Total aid/GDP) 0.024 0.145*** 0.195*** 0.107** 0.100***
(0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.002)
Ln (Total aid/GDP) squared -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.023** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001)
Ln (Oshore bank loans/GDP) 0.490*** -3.135*** -4.222*** -4.820*** -6.511***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln (Oshore bank loans/GDP) 0.368*** 0.467*** 0.557*** 0.732***
squared (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Growth rate of GDP 0.108** 0.155*** 0.196*** 0.142*** 0.203***
per capita) lagged (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Fixed capital formation) 0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.031** 0.005
(0.812) (0.625) (0.361) (0.024) (0.621)
Ln (Initial GDP per capita) -0.024** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.034***
(0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Infant mortality) -0.018**
(0.015)
Ln (Ination) 1.499*** 1.939*** 1.714*** 1.349*** 1.872***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.204*** -0.262*** -0.226*** -0.173*** -0.254***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Govt. consumption) -0.009 0.009 -0.022* 0.015 0.008
(0.639) (0.479) (0.064) (0.303) (0.591)
Ln (School enrollment) 0.038* 0.057*** 0.008 0.055*** 0.051***
(0.077) (0.000) (0.474) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Rule of law) 0.036 0.087*** 0.065***
(0.212) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Regulatory quality) 0.170***
(0.000)
Ln (Government eectiveness) 0.098***
(0.000)
Hansen J test 0.718 0.258 0.162 0.351 0.32
2nd order autocorrelation test 0.072 0.906 0.093 0.807 0.899
# of observations 917 917 917 917 917
# of countries, n 110 110 110 110 110
# of instruments, i 68 84 84 84 84
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.62 1.31 1.25 1.31 1.31
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal eect of aid 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.011*** 0.004***
Marginal eect of loans 0.156*** -0.046*** 0.161*** 0.035***
Critical Value of Aid/Loans (X) 4.131 4.382 4.247 4.396
39Table 8: Dependent variable: Ln (Growth rate of GDP per capita); Estimation technique:
the system-GMM
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln (Bilateral aid/GDP) 0.014 0.219*** 0.300*** 0.178*** 0.04
(0.503) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.451)
Ln (Bilateral aid/GDP) -0.051*** -0.061*** -0.041*** -0.010
squared (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.338)
Ln (Oshore bank loans/GDP) 0.380*** -4.075*** -6.138*** -5.882*** -6.947***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Oshore bank loans/GDP) 0.472*** 0.683*** 0.669*** 0.776***
squared (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Growth rate of GDP 0.180*** 0.226*** 0.241*** 0.201*** 0.248***
per capita) lagged (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Fixed capital formation) -0.026* -0.010 -0.008 -0.020 0.025**
(0.086) (0.190) (0.462) (0.118) (0.016)
Ln (Initial GDP per capita) -0.032*** -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.028***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Ln (Infant mortality) -0.031***
(0.001)
Ln (Ination) 1.176*** 1.295*** 1.329*** 1.120*** 1.041***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Ination) squared -0.149*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.139*** -0.132***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Govt. consumption) 0.009 -0.001 -0.029*** -0.008 0.018*
(0.587) (0.909) (0.000) (0.525) (0.066)
Ln (School enrollment) 0.055** 0.045*** -0.007 0.043*** 0.049***
(0.017) (0.000) (0.645) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln (Rule of law) 0.055** 0.081*** 0.068***
(0.032) (0.000) (0.000)




Hansen J test 0.589 0.232 0.193 0.428 0.486
2nd order autocorrelation test 0.104 0.792 0.705 0.99 0.955
# of observations 917 917 917 917 917
# of countries, n 110 110 110 110 110
# of instruments, i 68 84 88 84 84
Instrument ratio, r = n=i 1.62 1.31 1.25 1.31 1.31
Time eect included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal eect of aid 0.021*** 0.063*** 0.019*** 0.001
Marginal eect of loans 0.146*** -0.030*** 0.100*** -0.008***
Critical Value of Aid/Loans (X) 4.105 4.327 4.268 3.988
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